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Most literature about civil-military relations focuses on civilian control of the military in 
order to thwart future coup attempts. The debate centers on what factors help or hinder 
this democratic civilian control of the military. This thesis departs from the standard 
civilian versus military debate and posits that cogent defense policy is the product of 
effective civil-military relations and actually facilitates its consolidation.  
This thesis will focus on the consolidation of civil-military relations in Brazil 
from the standpoint of defense policy. The question of why the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) published a national defense strategy (NDS) in 2008 lies in why Brazil 
established a MOD in 1999, 14 years after its return to democracy. After examining 
factors such as civilian knowledge, incentives, military prerogatives, and institution-
building, one factor emerges as the catalyst for defense policy in contemporary Brazil: 
executive leadership. Just as the leadership and vision of President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso prompted the establishment of the Ministry of Defense in 1999, President Lula 
da Silva ordered his MOD to publish its first NDS in 2008, legitimizing Brazil’s desire to 
be not only a Latin American power, but also an international powerhouse. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Despite first establishing a democracy in 1946, the Brazilian people succumbed to 
military rule in 1964 and remained incapable of transitioning back to democracy until 
1985.1 Since then, Brazil’s citizenry has shown its resolve to not repeat its dictatorial 
history by consolidating its democracy and establishing sustained civilian control over its 
armed forces.  
One of the tenets of civil-military relations (CMR), democratic civilian control of 
the military, typically occurs within defense ministries. In Brazil, however, civilian 
control over its military is present in other organizations as well. For example, not only 
do civilians use the Ministry of Defense (MOD) as a mechanism to exert civilian control 
of the military, but also use regulations associated with the Public Ministry.2  
The Ministry of Defense began operations in 1999, a full 14 years after Brazil’s 
transition to democracy. After almost a decade of policy silence, the MOD published its 
National Defense Strategy in 2008 followed by a White Book on National Defense in 
2012. What factors explain the timing and evolution of Brazil’s defense policy?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson observed, “The available literature in 
English on the topic of civil-military relations in Brazil is very limited in number of 
authors, perspectives, and additionally, much of it is dated.”3 Additionally, they noted, 
“there is still no useful framework for analysis of civil-military relations and national 
                                                 
1 An observation that sets Brazil apart from other Latin American countries in terms of democratic 
transition and civil-military relations is the manner in which the transition of power occurred. While 
extreme animosity between civilians and the armed forces existed in other countries, in Brazil the two sides 
were seen as “loyal partners” because “the military did not suffer a collapse, but simply stepped aside.” 
Carlos Escudé and Andrés Fontana, “Argentina’s Security Policies: Their Rationale and Regional Context,” 
in International Security and Democracy Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. 
Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 66. 
2 Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and 
Reality” (unpublished, 2013), 14. 
3 Ibid., 2. 
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defense in general.”4 This thesis will not only acknowledge the excellent work already 
accomplished in the civil-military relations field as applied to Latin America, but will 
seek to add to current academic thought concerning Brazil’s defense strategy. For 
instance, Bruneau and others demonstrated that there is more to effective civil-military 
relations than just democratic control of the armed forces.5 I will propose that effective 
civil-military relations theory includes not only knowledgeable civilian leadership and 
effective militaries, but also cogent and timely defense policy, which ties civil-military 
organizations together in achieving unity among the roles and missions within the MOD.  
Since the consolidation of democracy in Brazil is largely uncontested among 
scholars, is that also true for Brazilian civil-military relations in general? By looking 
specifically at the Ministry of Defense as the presumed model of civil-military relations, 
this thesis will establish the status of CMR consolidation in contemporary Brazil. 
Additionally, if the Brazilian Ministry of Defense can publish influential defense 
policy, it will reflect the importance of preparing the country against national security 
threats (real, perceived, or unknown). Focused attention from national leadership on 
defense strategy will help consolidate CMR within the Ministry of Defense even more, 
instead of allowing the spread of democratic civilian control of the military out over 
multiple organizations, as is the case in Brazil today.  
Again, I intend to argue that effective and timely defense policy is the most 
important product the Brazilian MOD can produce and should be the third piece of 
effective CMR, after securing democratic civilian control of the military and employing 
an effective military. This idea is echoed in a statement from David Pion-Berlin and 
Harold Trinkunas that although “national defense policy has not been a high priority … a 
well thought-out defense policy could certainly contribute to national security” after the 
proper institutions are in place.6 
                                                 
4 Bruneau and Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality,” 4. 
5 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox 
Revisited,” Revista Fuerzas Armadas Y Sociedad 19, no. 1 (2005): 116. 
6 David Pion-Berlin and Harold A Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore Defense 
Policy in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review 42, no. 3 (2007): 76, 78. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Why did it take nine years for Brazil’s Ministry of Defense to start publishing 
defense strategy? The answer may lie in the same factors that led to the establishment of 
the MOD itself. Among the many hypotheses that originate from an investigation into the 
timing of Brazilian defense policy, four are most noteworthy and deserve further 
exploration. Each hypothesis will look at a different element of civil-military relations: 
knowledge, incentives, prerogatives, and institutional development within the MOD. 
First, it is possible that civilian knowledge finally improved to the level where it was 
possible to write a national defense policy as noted by Thomas Bruneau, Harold 
Trinkunas, David Pion-Berlin, and others. Second, scholars such as Wendy Hunter 
provide insight into how politicians’ incentives changed in the last 5–10 years so it was 
electorally important for the government to produce a national defense policy. Third, 
military prerogatives (or autonomy) identified by Alfred Stepan finally eroded enough 
that a national defense policy was possible, or in other words, it was in the military’s 
interest to write national defense policy. Finally, Thomas Bruneau suggests that the 
Brazilian Ministry of Defense, as an institution, pushed for defense strategy as it matured. 
The following literature review will provide a more in-depth outline of the tentative 
arguments that will determine which one of these hypotheses best explains the timing of 
Brazilian defense policy. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis will be a qualitative analysis of civil-military relations consolidation in 
Brazil and its effects on defense policy timing. Since CMR, let alone democracy, did not 
occur in Brazil all at once, this analysis will look across decades of academic analysis to 
find relevant explanations for the four previously-outlined hypotheses to determine the 
most probable cause(s) of why and when the MOD wrote its defense policy.  
The first hypothesis explores the possibility that civilian knowledge finally 
improved to the level where it was possible to write a national defense policy in 2008. 
The group of scholars that focuses on civilians as the key to effective civil-military 
relations includes Thomas Bruneau, Harold Trinkunas, David Pion-Berlin, and others. 
 4 
These scholars offer an additional approach to the civil-military relations study by 
examining the factors that should help consolidate civil-military relations. They want to 
eliminate the deficit in civilian defense knowledge and claim the need for knowledgeable 
civilians to lead not only politically, but also in a context of national defense.  
This civilian-focused camp argues for knowledgeable, but not expert, defense 
civilians. Many scholars accept that civilians do need some baseline level of defense 
acumen to be effective in creating defense policy. Thomas Bruneau advocates the 
imperative that civilian-led institutions, especially the Ministries of Defense, “establish 
stable institutions that embody and perpetuate the expertise needed to deal with possible 
roles and missions as they arise.”7 Trinkunas adds to Bruneau’s observation on this issue 
as well and says, “Civilian control by oversight exists when politicians and bureaucrats 
are able to determine policies and approve military activities through an institutionalized 
professional defense bureaucracy.”8 
Bruneau further distinguishes himself within this group by suggesting that civilian 
leadership is only a part of the civil-military relations equation. In fact, he says that 
democratic civilian leadership of the military is only one of three important components 
for effective civil-military relations.9 He talks about civilian and military effectiveness, 
but as other scholars mentioned in this review, leaves room for an analysis of defense 
policy within the model of consolidated or democratic civil-military relations theory. 
Timely and effective defense strategy demonstrates civilian knowledge, gives the military 
a clear mission, addresses national security concerns, and deserves a commensurate 
budget. 
The second hypothesis discusses how politicians’ incentives may have changed in 
the last 5-10 years so that it was now in their interest to have a national defense policy. 
The works of Wendy Hunter help focus on this question as to how politicians avoided 
                                                 
7 Bruneau, “The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited,” 121. 
8 Harold A Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative 
Perspective (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 5–6; overall argument framework 
for this section applied from David J Bennett, “The Trinity: A New Approach to Civil-Military Relations?” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 3. 
9 Bruneau, “The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited.” 
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defense issues in the past. Hunter does not mention anything about civilians needing 
incentives in knowing more about defense issues in general, but states that civilians had 
incentives to weaken the military prerogatives that Stepan laid out in his book.10 
Tollefson offers an invaluable insight into Hunter’s contributions as well. He says that 
Wendy Hunter adds more rational actor theory to the study of civil-military relations, 
while Stepan and Zaverucha focus on game theory.11 
Pion-Berlin argues that “what Latin America needs are civilians who can manage 
the military in political-, not defense-, oriented terms.”12 This approach is similar to J. 
Samuel Fitch’s in that the onus is on the civilian leadership to manage the armed forces 
within a political framework and not worry so much about acquiring defense knowledge. 
Pion-Berlin argues that defense knowledge is not very necessary to civilian leaders 
because “there is a complete absence of civilian defense-related insight, influence, and 
expertise, yet military subordination to civilian rule has largely been achieved.”13 
Trinkunas adds to this argument by saying that although civil-military relations are 
moving forward and consolidating in Latin America without defense-minded civilians, he 
states that avoiding defense knowledge is not a calculated move on the part of politicians 
or defense civilians, as Wendy Hunter might suggest.14 It comes down to an absence of 
incentives to study defense issues, causing an “attention deficit” in matters of national 
security.15  
The third hypothesis seeks to determine if military prerogatives (or autonomy) 
finally eroded enough that a national defense policy was possible or was in the military’s 
interest to write one. The works of Alfred Stepan, and later Jorge Zaverucha, seek to 
explain the obstacles in moving toward democratic civilian control of the military 
                                                 
10 Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 
11 Scott D. Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: The Myth of Tutelary Democracy” 
(presented at the Latin America Studies Association, Washington DC, 1995), 3.  
12 David Pion-Berlin, “Political Management of the Military in Latin America,” Military Review 85, 
no. 1 (2005): 19. 
13Ibid., 27. 
14 Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective, 2. 
15 Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits.” 
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following a military dictatorship. The obstacles range from high military prerogatives to a 
high degree of military autonomy, which delays the transfer of power from the military 
regime to the elected civilian democratic leaders.  
Stepan is famous for his 11 military prerogatives found in his 1988 book, 
Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. In it, Stepan shows that since 
military prerogatives were high, democratic civilian control of the military could not 
occur.16 Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson demonstrated that military prerogatives 
were high even in 1985 (the official start of Brazil’s contemporary democracy), but that 
over time, the military lost the ability to maintain its autonomy and could no longer evade 
direction from civilians.17 Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson demonstrated that the 
military prerogatives did indeed go from high to low as civil-military relations 
consolidated in Brazil.18  
If weakened military prerogatives contribute to the civil-military relations 
situation in Brazil today, then Zaverucha’s claims of an autonomous military may be 
inadequate in explaining the current situation in Brazil, but it may help explain the delay 
in defense policy creation prior to 2008. However, Zaverucha argues that because of 
weak civilian leadership in the Brazilian Ministry of Defense, the military could choose 
its responsibilities and missions without much direction from civilian leadership.19  
J. Samuel Fitch takes a more balanced approach between what Zaverucha argues 
and what the military and civilian leaderships accomplish together in strengthening civil-
military relations. Fitch also disagrees with Stepan in that military prerogatives and 
civilian control are not mutually exclusive. Fitch writes, “It makes more sense to define 
                                                 
16 These 11 military prerogatives are: 1) constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military in 
political system, 2) military relationship to the chief executive, 3) coordination of defense sector, 4) active 
duty military participation in the Cabinet, 5) role of Legislature, 6) role of senior career civil servants or 
civilian political appointees, 7) role in intelligence, 8) role in police, 9) role in military promotions, 10) role 
in state enterprises, and 11) role in legal system. Alfred C. Stepan, Rethinking Military Political Politics: 
Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 94–97. 
17 Bruneau and Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality.” 
18 Ibid. 
19 Jorge Zaverucha, “Fragile Democracy and the Militarization of Public Safety in Brazil,” Latin 
American Perspectives 27, no. 3 (2000): 8–31. 
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democratic civil-military relations affirmatively, by what they are rather than what they 
are not.”20 Fitch states that either the civilian-led institutions determine the strategic 
direction of the military, or they do not. Democratic civil-military relations exist in the 
affirmative, but not in the negative. For Fitch, these new conditions are mutually 
exclusive.21  
The final hypothesis posits that the MOD itself pushed for more published 
defense policies. While Hunter discusses other incentives that politicians used in the past 
to weaken military prerogatives, neither she nor most scholars look at the motivations for 
drafting defense policy. In addition to the democratic civilian control of the military, 
Thomas Bruneau suggests that the civil-military relations community should also 
examine the processes that drive defense strategy and the institutions that oversee that 
effort, principally the Ministry of Defense.22 Primary sources will provide insight into 
this question since there is not much published material on this issue of defense policy 
motivations since the defense documents themselves are new and interest in defense 
issues are just starting to flourish in Brazil.23 
In summary, the academic community appears split on the reasons for the timing 
of national defense organization in Brazil, which will also help explain the timing of 
defense policy in Brazil. One side argues that military prerogatives were high, which 
afforded the armed forces the ability to delay democratic civilian control of the military. 
The other side argues that the democratic institutions were in place for democratic 
civilian control of the military, but there was a deficit of knowledgeable defense civilian 
leadership with incentives to consolidate CMR in Brazil. Some scholars chose a position 
in the middle of these camps and often added research in one camp or another depending 
on the newest developments in Brazil and Latin America in general. The term “middle” is 
                                                 
20 J. Samuel Fitch, “Military Attitudes toward Democracy in Latin America,” in Civil-Military 
Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 62. 
21 J. Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998), 37–38, 40. 
22 Thomas Bruneau, personal communication, August 14, 2013.  
23 Bruneau and Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality,” 3. 
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used here to describe the scholars that take a more moderate approach to explaining CMR 
consolidation in Brazil and neither positing that the civilians nor the military was the 
main factor, but a combination of both actors yielded results. The commonality of all 
three of these groups is that Brazil still struggles in consolidating its national defense 
apparatus and do not mention much about national defense policy. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Dr. Thomas Bruneau’s civil-military relations “trinity” provides a model for 
examining the extent of CMR consolidation, the role of democratic civilian control over 
the armed forces, and the effectiveness and efficiency of the military,24 even though 
“there is … no useful framework for analysis of civil-military relations and national 
defense in general.”25 However, instead of applying effectiveness and efficiency to the 
military as in the original trinity framework, I will use the trinity framework as a lens in 
examining Brazil’s MOD in order to understand its overall effectiveness by explaining 
the delays in publishing defense policy. Since efficiency is difficult to articulate, let alone 
measure, this thesis will focus on the importance of defense policy when measuring CMR 
consolidation. 
Again, this thesis will provide a qualitative analysis of available research 
materials in determining the motivations and timing of Brazil’s defense policy. Primary 
sources should help us discover motivations much better than the speculation often found 
in secondary sources; however, where there is a shortage of primary source material, 
academically vetted and other respected secondary sources will fill in any gaps in the 
research. 
F. OVERVIEW 
This thesis will provide a background on the origins of the Brazilian Ministry of 
Defense before delving into the potential reasons for the delay and evolution of Brazil’s 
defense policy. The background will also include an analysis of the formation of the 
                                                 
24 Bruneau, “The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited,” 122. 
25 Bruneau and Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality,” 4. 
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MOD using the same four dimensions that will help analyze our defense policy 
hypotheses: knowledge, incentives, prerogatives, and institutional development. The 
following chapter will explain why the MOD finally created defense strategy after 2008, 
using the four hypotheses, or dimensions, as a guide. The concluding remarks will 
summarize the results of this study and present the most plausible reason for Brazil’s 
timing in designing its national defense strategy, namely the arrival of an energized 
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II. BRAZIL’S MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
A. FORMATION OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
In order to understand the Brazilian Ministry of Defense’s timing in publishing 
defense policy, we will need to first examine if those same factors affected the 
establishment of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)—where defense policy originates.26 
What factors contributed to Brazil’s government establishing its own MOD?27 According 
to a United States Army War College analysis of Brazilian defense strategy, Lieutenant 
Colonel Linwood Ham, Jr. observed that the first order of business for Brazil’s civilian 
government was not to reconstitute the military, but to consolidate the fledgling 
democracy instead. Ham further argued that the consolidation continued for years as a 
Ministry of Defense was finally created in 1999.28  
On June 9, 1999, Complementary Law 97 authorized the creation of Brazil’s 
Ministry of Defense. Prior to this event, the president, the various armed force  
 
                                                 
26 Brazil’s transition from a military dictatorship to a democracy is an example of effective civil-
military relations and the Ministry of Defense is the capstone of that process. A Ministry of Defense is one 
of the “formal institutions that promote civilian authority” in a civil-military relations construct. Wendy 
Hunter, “Assessing Civil-Military Relations in Postauthoritarian Brazil,” in Democratic Brazil: Actors, 
Institutions, and Processes, ed. Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy Joseph Power (Pittsburgh, PA: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 103. 
27 The quintessential quality of Brazilian life that permeates throughout culture and government 
institutions is the deixá-la para amanhã (leave it until tomorrow) attitude. This idea was typified in Brazil 
with the timeline started during the military regime and that continued toward democratization in the 
1980s. In 1974, the military regime started an abertura (opening) toward democracy, meaning they would 
relinquish control in an orderly manner to try the experiment of democracy once more. Boris Fausto, A 
Concise History of Brazil (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 317. 
Why did the military regime start to open its closed government and move towards democratic 
thinking in 1974? One convincing answer comes from Drs. Bruneau and Trinkunas who stated that the 
Portuguese Revolution of 1974 initiated a Third Wave of democracy, an event that Brazil would be hard-
pressed to avoid being influenced by in an era of the growing globalization of ideas. Additionally they 
concluded that “few scholars include external factors in their analyses of democratic consolidation”—a 
mistake this thesis will try to avoid. See Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, “International Democracy 
Promotion and Its Impacts on Civil-Military Relations,” in Global Politics of Defense Reform, ed. Thomas 
Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 63. 
28 Linwood Ham Jr., Brazil’s National Defense Strategy—A Deepening of Civilian Control (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009), 1, 7–10. 
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components, and the Congress were all a part of this law-making process.29 Although the 
military was against establishing a Ministry of Defense and giving up cabinet-level 
positions in the government as a consequence, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
managed to fulfill a campaign promise to establish a MOD toward the end of his first 
term in office, positioning himself for impending reelection.30  
B. FACTORS LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MINISTRY 
OF DEFENSE 
1. Civilian Defense Knowledge  
A best practice that could balance the need for civilian legal authority and 
political power in Brazil was to develop a cadre of defense civilians.31 The capacity for 
civilian leaders to understand defense issues would strengthen legitimacy of the newly 




                                                 
29 In Brazilian parlance, congressional approval of a law makes it complementary; without 
congressional approval, it would be a decree.  
30 Summarized from Samuel H. Prugh, “The Creation of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense” 
(unpublished, n.d.). Obtained from Dr. Thomas Bruneau with permission from Colonel Prugh, January 14, 
2014. 
31 Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter, Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 73.  
During this new period of Brazilian democracy, government civilians had limited knowledge of 
defense issues since the military bureaucracy used its military staff for decades prior to democratic 
transition. Additionally, there was a “brain drain” following democratization and many talented Brazilians 
left the country with any built-up knowledge as a response to Sarney’s leadership. Thomas E. Skidmore, 
Brazil: Five Centuries of Change (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 188.  
Although there was a lack of defense knowledge, civilians possessed political shrewdness nonetheless. 
It was observed at this time that the “Brazilian government [was] misused by a clever elite.” Fausto, A 
Concise History of Brazil, 335. 
It is my opinion also that the time had not come for defense issues to be at the forefront of the new 
political agenda and did not provide the incentives necessary to push for defense policy. 
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policies.32 Essentially, “civilian expertise is most effective if put into practice when at 
least some degree of confidence between the new authorities and the military has been 
cultivated.”33    
Arguably, the creation of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense did not happen until 
there was a preponderance of both civilian and military knowledge to run this type of 
organization, or at least the desire to develop this defense knowledge organically in a 
centralized location.34 Defense knowledge on the military side was present, but if Brazil 
wanted to have democratic civilian control of the military, a cadre of knowledgeable 
civilians was needed, but lacking in the initial stages of this process.35 David Pion-Berlin 
and Harold Trinkunas focused on this lack of civilian knowledge as an “attention deficit” 
that made the idea of a defense institution managed by civilians a lower priority within 
the new government due to ignorance more than anything else.36 
Later in his research, Pion-Berlin recognized that as a democracy consolidates, so 
must the concepts of civil-military relations. As an advocate of robust civilian knowledge 
as a prerequisite for effective CMR, he recognized that consolidation could take place as 
                                                 
32 Knowledge is important to CMR because stable civil-military relations require “civilians … know 
enough to be able to ensure that the armed forces are doing what they are required to do, not only in terms 
of submitting to civilian control, but also in successfully fulfilling the current very wide spectrum of roles 
and missions assigned to security forces in Latin America.” Thomas C. Bruneau and Richard B. Goetze Jr., 
“Civilian-Military Relations in Latin America,” Military Review 86, no. 5 (2006): 67.  
Knowledge is also important because it is “one of the most critical power resources of any actor” and 
“can change what is considered relevant to national and international security.” Anne Clunan, 
“Globalization and the Impact of Norms on Defense Restructuring,” in Global Politics of Defense Reform, 
ed. Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 35. 
33 Felipe Agüero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining: Civilians and the Military in Shaping 
Postauthoritarian Regimes,” in Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, ed. 
David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 205. 
34 Even as late as 2001, Latin America (Brazil included) still had issues in terms of civilian knowledge 
and defense issues since “civilian governments [still needed] to empower themselves with defense 
knowledge so they [could] earn the confidence of their [military] officers.” David Pion-Berlin, 
“Introduction,” in Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, ed. David Pion-
Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 12. 
35 Once civilians understand that “civil control may be defined as aiming and guiding the military 
toward socially acceptable goals,” or incentives, then “the more accurate and descriptive term is civilian 
direction of the military,” not necessarily civilian control of the military (emphasis added). Douglas L. 
Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 26, no. 1 (1999): 19. 
36 Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits,” 76, 78. 
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a result of this concept of defense knowledge. Pion-Berlin also spoke of the danger of 
attention deficits becoming wisdom deficits.37  
As countries such as Brazil realized that knowledge was important in establishing 
and running effective CMR organizations, such as its new Ministry of Defense, then 
civil-military consolidation would occur as knowledge consolidated in the form of 
wisdom.38 Defense wisdom made civilians capable of finally “institutionalizing” a 
legitimate dialogue with the military.39  
A counterargument to the need of knowledgeable defense civilians is the 
abundance of trained and knowledgeable military officers, possessing the knowledge of 
when and where to advise his civilian counterpart. Some may suppose that a military 
officer’s career training is more robust to that of civilians and often relevant to issues 
other than defense, making them marketable in business circles as well. This focus on 
knowledge, however, is also dangerous to democracy and civil-military relations in 
general because this “perception invites the continuation of politicized professionalism in 
posttranstion regimes” and “undermine[s] democratic regimes from within.”40 
Knowledge is a tool, but like any other would-be weapon, it must be used appropriately 
and proportionately to the challenge. 
A ministry of defense is an evident choice to house defense knowledge that can be 
passed from one generation to another while developing its own culture and norms that 
will guide future policy as directed and influenced by the executive branch of 
government. Once CMR is embedded within institutions, it will be reinforced by 
experience and will become usable history for the organization.41 Then, one new criterion 
for a strong civil-military apparatus starts with powerful and charismatic leadership that 
                                                 
37 David Pion-Berlin, “The Defense Wisdom Deficit in Latin America: A Reply to Thomas C. 
Bruneau,” Revista Fuerzas Armadas Y Sociedad 20, no. 1 (n.d.): 51–62. 
38 For this analysis, wisdom is defined as “applied knowledge” and manifests itself fully in well-
written defense policy that not only focuses on the future of Brazil, but draws from the past as well. It 
attempts to avoid mistakes that other countries made and that Brazil could avoid through effective 
application of defense wisdom. 
39 Domínguez and Shifter, Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, 72. 
40 Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America, 32. 
41 Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” 16. 
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1) hires talented and knowledgeable civilian leadership within an established defense 
career track,42 2) publishes meaningful policy, and 3) empowers the armed forces to carry 
out policy in order to increase national security and not for show (often called para inglês 
ver or “for the English to see”), or for any other political purpose. Institutional 
development and policy improvement will better confront the challenge that civilians 
have in “better design[ing] and manag[ing] the missions assigned to the armed forces.”43 
These missions encompass national defense and security, which “defines the corporate 
identity of the armed forces, and the management of security policy is the yardstick of 
civilian control … regarding missions, duties, military prerogatives, and expenditures.”44 
In sum, a lack of civilian defense knowledge greatly attributed to the delayed 
establishment of the actual Ministry of Defense, which only came into existence in 1999, 
14 years after Brazil’s transition to democracy.  
2. Political Incentives 
Civilian defense knowledge needed to develop into an understanding of the role 
of civilian leadership within the MOD, motivating defense civilians and incentivizing 
                                                 
42 This discussion of civilian knowledge does not mean that civilians need to know everything about 
defense issues. It would be unfair to expect defense civilians to come close to the knowledge military 
leaders gain over decades of applied experience. However, civilians must rely on their military counterparts 
to supply them with the expertise and advice needed to share the responsibility of parallel civil-military 
relations. Michael Desch wrote about this very subject when he said that “the bottom line is that while 
civilian leaders should have the final word on most issues of national [defense] policy, they should not 
speak the final word until they are sure that they have fully utilized military expertise.” Michael C. Desch, 
Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001), 143.  
Bland contributed the following: “Even in mature liberal democracies, there is an expectation that 
military leaders will share in decision-making regarding national defense and the employment of the armed 
forces with their civilian superiors.” Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” 11.  
Civilians must realize that “national defense depends on military capacity, [which] justifies 
disproportionate expenditures on technological and industrial innovations.” David R. Mares, “Civil-
Military Relations, Democracy, and the Regional Neighborhood,” in Civil-Military Relations: Building 
Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe, ed. David R. 
Mares (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 5.  
Likewise, government civilian knowledge should include more than just defense knowledge since 
“defense budgets demand resources, and agreement over the armed forces budget can be ruined when 
civilians mishandle economic development.” Ibid., 8. 
43 Pion-Berlin, “Introduction,” 12. 
44 Craig L. Arceneaux and David Pion-Berlin, Transforming Latin America: The International and 
Domestic Origins of Change (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 157. 
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them toward further professional development. Incentivized civilians tend to understand 
their respective professions and lead accordingly.45 Incentivized politicians, however, not 
defense civilians, own the national debate for creating new institutions and since politics 
is about power and survival, national defense needs to be popular and important enough 
to incentivize powerful political pragmatists to want maximum control over events and 
processes—one of which is the establishment of the MOD.46 
For more than a decade after democratization, “civilian politicians saw that 
confronting the military on [establishing an MOD] would not yield immediate electoral 
benefits” though.47 In transitioning from a military-led government to a new democracy, 
there is often a need to not immediately approach defense issues in order to provide the 
military reassurance that the civilian government will not hastily change sensitive 
policies that the military is accustomed to controlling.48 Brazilian politicians knew that 
sweeping changes could undermine civilian control of the military.   
Still, the political incentives in Brazil to further consolidate civil-military relations 
and establish a MOD did not appear favorable at the time of democratization in 1985. 
Brazil appeared to have low political unity, damaged international prestige due to 
                                                 
45 It was observed that “Pion-Berlin’s assertion that there is no incentive to become knowledgeable in 
military affairs may be spot on.” See Bennett, “The Trinity: A New Approach”; Pion-Berlin, “Political 
Management of the Military in Latin America,” 19; Pion-Berlin, “The Defense Wisdom Deficit in Latin 
America: A Reply to Thomas C. Bruneau.”  
Brazilian politicians did not challenge the military’s apparent control over defense issues during the 
late 1980s since they were more concerned with keeping their jobs. The newly-elected democratic 
politicians faced constraints from the type of military transfer of power and the debt crisis such that defense 
issues could not be further from their minds at this time. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 187.  
Civilians did not target the military’s prerogatives or autonomy that hampered civil-military relations 
in Brazil at the time and were as much of the problem as the armed forces, especially if the civilians only 
“confront the armed forces over issues that carry greater resonance with the public … and have a greater 
impact on their reelection potential.” Wendy Hunter, “Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile: Present Trends, Future Prospects,” in Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America, 
ed. Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 307. 
46 Wendy Hunter, “Reason, Culture, or Structure?: Assessing Civil-Military Dynamics in Brazil,” in 
Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 43–44. 
47 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers, 47. 
48 Agüero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining,” 205. 
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underdevelopment of its infrastructure and institutions, and acted like the “France of 
Latin America,” with all of the connotations that come with such a label.49 In order to 
progress from this stereotype, Brazil needed a catalyst, which came from a charismatic 
national leader.  
Toward the end of the Cardoso administration, President Cardoso revived the idea 
of establishing a Ministry of Defense. His incentives included the rationalization of the 
various missions among the different bureaucracies (including the future MOD) and the 
improvement of Brazil’s international image.50 President Cardoso also presided over an 
improving economy that could fund a new civil-military institution and start the process 
of re-examining Brazil’s defense policy.51 Cardoso could politically afford to invest in 
civil-military relations because he was able to solve many of the domestic issues that 
appeared to be more important, such as improving the economic environment with his 
Real Plan, and brought “great legislative prestige and experience to the executive 
office.”52 Whatever “executive-legislative deadlock” that existed before, was loosened 
enough to facilitate the institutional development of civil-military relations in Brazil, 
embodied by a new Ministry of Defense.53 
3. Prerogatives 
In a response to the aspirations of the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, the 
Brazilian senator Jose Sarney stated that “it is a [great] danger for Brazil and all of Latin 
America to have a military power in our continent.”54 Although this statement came from 
a civilian leader, the military establishment had a different perspective of how to maintain 
regional security. The Brazilian military wanted to maintain whatever power it had left 
                                                 
49 Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin, Transforming Latin America, 62. 
50 Monica Hirst, “Security Policies, Democratization, and Regional Integration in the Southern Cone,” 
in International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. 
Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 108. 
51 Agüero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining,” 206. 
52 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 188. 
53 Ibid., 220. 
54 Leandro Prada, “Venezuela’s Planned Arms Purchases Leave Neighbors Unsettled,” CNS News, 
August 20, 2013, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/venezuelas-planned-arms-purchases-leave-neighbors-
unsettled; taken from non-functioning source link found in Bennett, “The Trinity: A New Approach.” 
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from the democratic transition and codify the right to use military force well before the 
MOD started, while military officials concurrently locked in favorable salary structures 
and heavily influenced foreign policy decisions on matters of national defense.55  
Following the creation of the MOD, however, military leaders lost whatever 
influence at the executive level of government it retained following the democratic 
transition from authoritarian rule. Brazil’s democratic government moved away from 
allowing military influence in activities that the armed forces traditionally had guidance 
or control over, such as picking key government leadership, setting public policy, and 
supervising internal security.56 As defense policy transitioned into a matter of public 
policy, the military maintained even less autonomy, especially as defense policy would 
be developed predominately from the top government officials and not originating within 
the military itself. In light of this environment, however, military prerogatives remained 
due to concessions from the civilian side of Brazilian government: “In fact, the tacit 
arrangement that appears to have emerged is that civilians [were] willing to grant officers 
considerable autonomy in their own sphere of influence in exchange for noninterference 
in civilian decision making.”57 Observed as late as 2003, “Brazil’s military [retained] 
prerogatives under democratic rule that [resembled] those under the military government” 
and retained a certain amount of power in politics and autonomy in its operations.58 Thus, 
the perception of military prerogatives remained complicated, both within and outside of 
the armed forces.   
The armed forces, however, did not feel they continued to have strong 
prerogatives and autonomy. The 1999 establishment of the Ministry of Defense severely 
weakened military prerogatives, especially from a Brazilian Air Force perspective. As a 
part of the presidential decrees establishing the MOD and defining its structure, the air 
forces relinquished control of the Department of Civilian Aviation, a huge controlling 
                                                 
55 Hirst, “Security Policies, Democratization, and Regional Integration in the Southern Cone,” 108. 
56 Harold Trinkunas, “Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela,” in Civil-Military 
Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 165. 
57 Hunter, “Reason, Culture, or Structure?,” 39. 
58 Domínguez and Shifter, Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, 46. 
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stake in the aircraft manufacturer Embraer, and the nation’s airport administration 
structure in order for the MOD to have these missions. These actions not only weakened 
military prerogatives, but were also a drain on corporate knowledge as intelligent leaders 
either resigned or lost their jobs during the transition.59 
One author noted that “the Brazilian military’s declining power over the first 
decade of civilian rule is all the more impressive, given the weakness of civilian 
institutions and the absence of any sustained civilian effort to consolidate a system of 
democratic control of the armed forces.”60 Additionally, military prerogatives around the 
time of the early Ministry of Defense demonstrated that the military in Brazil was neither 
“in a conspiratorial mode” nor was it “complacent” since it did “show signs of 
displeasure with missions, budgets, government policy, and political ineptitude.”61 
Wendy Hunter wrote that the core prerogative of the military at this time was to prevent 
the MOD from forming since each service wanted to preserve its own autonomy of 
decision-making within each service. The military succeeded in preventing the MOD 
from happening until 1999.62 Even though establishing the MOD was a success for 
civilian leadership against military prerogatives, the early Ministry of Defense had much 
work to do.  
The armed forces, however, were not the only ones to have prerogatives that 
influenced the establishment of the Ministry of Defense in Brazil. Civilian prerogatives 
also existed, which included the ideas of organizational direction, guidance, national 
objectives, budget, and the use of military force to make the MOD effective. Contrarily, 
military prerogatives focused on roles and missions aligned with their stated goals and 
objectives, which were not published at the national level yet as a strategy. 
Optimistically, having separate prerogatives allowed expertise to develop, but did not 
close the gap between civilians and the military in terms of a unified strategy in the  
 
                                                 
59 Domínguez and Shifter, Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, 47. 
60 Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America, 53. 
61 Pion-Berlin, “Introduction,” 1. 
62 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers, 44. 
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mission and roles of each group. Both sides needed to find a way to align their 
prerogatives in such a way to move toward a shared, consolidated form of civil-military 
relations.63  
One argument towards consolidated CMR states that civilian control is the key in 
controlling military prerogatives and maintaining democracies; I disagree.64 My personal 
view is that a consolidation of CMR in general needs to happen in a manner where no 
one entity feels stronger than the other. An extreme consolidation of civilian control will 
only create resentment among military forces and could result in the military shirking 
orders from civilians or becoming less effective and efficient due to the lack of care and 
feeding received from civilian leadership. All that civilian control needs to accomplish is 
enough strengthening to be an equal partner with the defense arm of the state. Civilians 
should direct the strategic vision of defense since that encompasses the diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic principles that only the state should implement. 
The military tactically and operationally executes the nation’s vision autonomously due 
to its expertise in defense matters. Thus, militaries will relinquish power to those they 
respect, strengthening civilian prerogatives, which will increase institutional capacity and 
democratic legitimacy. 
4. Institutional Development 
In order for civil-military relations to have a lasting influence, they must be 
centralized and contained within institutions that endure the coming and going of various 
leaders. In a reference to Brazil, it was said that “the most basic tenet of civilian control 
over the military, the allocation of the leadership and management of the nation’s defense 
policies to a civilian Ministry, involved a complex and tense process between the 
government and the military.”65 This process affected the way Brazil democratized and 
may help to explain the evolution of defense policy explored in the next chapter. Since 
the transition was military-led, the residual military prerogatives delayed what Trinkunas, 
                                                 
63 Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” 19. 
64 Trinkunas, “Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela,” 189. 
65 Domínguez and Shifter, Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, 47. 
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Hunter, and others argue as ideal CMR—where there is abundant civilian control of the 
military and the defense responsibilities are shared.66  
In addition, “institutions matter only when powerful protagonists agree to work 
within them.”67 This is a common theme among the research dimensions presented in this 
thesis: in a system of people, a person must be a catalyst of progress. Sometimes, as is the 
case with Brazil, it takes a powerful protagonist to create an institution in the first place. 
President Fernando Enrique Cardoso was Brazil’s president from 1994-2002 and in 1998, 
decided to create a ministry of defense. At the time, Brazil and Nicaragua were the only 
countries left in Latin America without a Ministry of Defense. His decision to establish a 
MOD also eliminated military leaders as cabinet members, thus reducing their 
prerogatives as stated earlier.68 There was “little resistance … from the military so long 
as the [MOD] objectives [coincided] with military interests,”69 but sadly, the institution 
that epitomizes civil-military control did not receive the attention it needed until 1998, 13 
years after democratization. 
Recently, Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson examined the state of Brazil’s 
democratic progress in terms of the strength of civil-military relations and the remaining 
challenges that lay ahead. They wrote that the Ministry of Defense formed in 1999, well 
after the 1985 democratic transition, and that the Ministry of Justice continues to have 
oversight into civil-military relations when it should be concentrated in the MOD. 
Bruneau and Tollefson raised another good point in that if Brazil were serious about 
fulfilling its ‘destiny’ from a national defense perspective, the fundamental challenge 
would be to prepare a cadre of educated civilians on defense matters, and to provide 
opportunities for careers and advancement in that sector. Brazil will likely have to invest 
in the same improvements among other institutions as well in order to develop into an 
equal partner among various international powers.70 
                                                 
66 See previous literature review in Chapter 1. 
67 Pion-Berlin, “Introduction,” 31. 
68 Hunter, “Reason, Culture, or Structure?,” 37. 
69 Domínguez and Shifter, Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, 64. 
70 Bruneau and Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality.” 
 22 
In summarizing additional challenges that ministries of defense face, especially in 
Brazil, David Pion-Berlin succinctly stated: 
The Ministry of Defense is generally ill-prepared to assume the important 
tasks mandated to it. Its civilian ministers do not arrive on the job well 
versed in defense issues, nor do they stay on the job long enough to 
acquire the skills. And its staff has not reaped the benefits of professional 
training because there has been no institutionalization of expertise within 
the ministry … The Defense Ministry’s lack of ministerial competence 
and continuity translates into a deficiency of will. Being less confident in 
the area, its ministers are more reticent to demonstrate leadership, 
deferring instead to military judgment.71  
Institutional development poses many problems that Pion-Berlin provides here as a 
summary of the challenges for institutionalizing defense including: knowledge deficits, 
incentives, and military prerogatives as mentioned previously. Furthermore, in the 
absence of geopolitical threats, strategy tends to be focused inwardly. The following 
chapter addresses the strategy that the MOD created in the absence of external threats and 
the possible reasons for the timing of those policies.  
 
                                                 
71 David Pion-Berlin, “Civil-Military Circumvention,” in Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: 
New Analytical Perspectives, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
2001), 147. 
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III. BRAZILIAN DEFENSE STRATEGY: 1996–2013 
A. DEFENSE POLICY DOCUMENTS 
Although written defense policy may have existed in Brazil for some time prior to 
democratization,72 this thesis will highlight post-democratization policy-making.73 
Before Brazil’s transition to democracy in 1985, a military regime governed for 21 years. 
During its rule, the regime further institutionalized what was called ‘national security 
doctrine.’ This doctrine actually began 30 years prior, at the beginning of the Vargas 
administration.74 Brazil was ahead of its Latin American counterparts in having its 
security/defense doctrine codified and tied to military projects, but was not published as a 
national defense policy tied to roles and missions outside the use of military force.75  
During the beginning of Vargas’ rule, the Law of National Security was passed 
and a Council of National Security was established to monitor the security of the nation 
and consolidate that national responsibility within the armed forces.76 Additionally, 
                                                 
72 In addition to explaining the reasons for delaying published defense policy, this thesis posits that the 
three components of an effective Ministry of Defense are: knowledgeable civilian leadership, a professional 
military, and a measurable mission (articulated through published defense strategy). The Bruneau CMR 
trinity touches on all three of these components, but since efficiency is almost impossible to measure, this 
section will focus on the trinity’s foundation of an effective and efficient military: effective policy. Bennett, 
“The Trinity: A New Approach.”  
This section will not go into the details of the CMR trinity, but will highlight policy as a possibility for 
binding civilian and military relations together. If civilians have buy-in with the policy (which they should 
because they should write it), they will fund it, and if the military thinks the strategy is legitimate, it will be 
implemented. Policy is what binds civilian control and military action. Policy provides (or should provide) 
the proper incentives to get civilians and the armed forces working together effectively. 
73 Domestic politics reveal the flipside of civil-military relations: the relationship of the public and the 
military, not just the interaction between civilian leadership and military leaders. Andrew J. Bacevich, 
“Whose Army?,” in The Modern American Military, ed. David M. Kennedy (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 194.  
Defense policy not only binds civil and military leaders together, but published policy acts as way of 
advertising the military’s mission to the citizenry in order to gain a stronger voice in domestic affairs and 
political agendas. Defense strategy and policy also ensures enough subordination to repress coup attempts, 
but leaves enough autonomy and purpose for the military to secure the nation. There is a fine line between 
subordination and oppression; the military will shirk responsibility if it feels belittled and rise to meet any 
threat if it feels valued. 
74 Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil, 208. 
75 Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America, 58. 
76 Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil, 212, 218. 
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Brazil internally published defense doctrine addressing internal security and 
revolutionary war predating the Cuban revolution.77 As shown with other policy and 
institutional development in contemporary Brazil and throughout the world, national 
defense doctrine would take time to consolidate and publish. Before examining the 
possible reason for this timing, we will look at the different defense documents Brazil has 
today. 
1. National Defense Policies: 1996–2007 
In November 1996, Brazil publicized its new defense policy authored entirely 
under a democratic government. This defense policy was similar to what other Latin 
American countries, known as white books or white papers, but was “the first time in 
Brazilian history that a civilian government … established guidelines of action for the 
armed forces.”78 “The Committee for Foreign Relations and Defense of the Presidency of 
the Republic drafted the new policy,” eliminating security tensions with Argentina and 
proposed moving the concentration of military forces from the southern part of Brazil to 
the Amazon region.79 It is ironic that one academic argument suggests that the military 
regime stepped aside in 1985 because the internal threats were gone, but only a decade 
later, internal security became the focus again.80 Any policy solution to an external 
security issue, however, would not be readily accepted if it came from the U.S. instead of 
developed within, but would be handled in this new era with partner countries in a 
“cooperative security” environment as demonstrated with the operations in Nicaragua, 
the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Haiti.81 
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278, 287. 
 25 
Cardoso’s National Defense Policy (NDP) made plain the civil-military paradigm 
that civilians were in charge of the military.82 The NDP also provided the military an 
external focus and broke away from blindly following the United States in matters of 
national security, while at the same time making amends with Argentina. The NDP also 
made defending and occupying the Amazon the number-one priority, which will be 
discussed further in this chapter.83 Although a NDP existed in 1996, it was a weak 
template that was not as robust as the 2008 National Defense Strategy would eventually 
become.  
The National Defense Plan concentrated on external threats such as hypothetical 
invasions from a regional neighbor or other adversarial actions (that never materialized). 
The NDP would also be negated by a “no enemies” policy since Brazil believed it had no 
external enemies and could look inward instead by focusing on endogenous security 
threats as part of its new era of national security strategy.84  
2. National Defense Strategy: 2008 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Brazil’s intent to create a new Ministry of 
Defense was announced in 1998, 13 years after Brazil transitioned to democracy from a 
military dictatorship that ruled for more than two decades. Ten years later, in 2008, the 
MOD published the first Brazilian National Defense Strategy (NDS) or what Brazil calls 
its Estratégia Nacional de Defesa. 
                                                 
82 Prior to the aforementioned democratic enlightenment of Cardoso, however, President Collor made 
institutional changes without creating new institutions per se by reducing the number of active duty military 
officers in his 26-member cabinet from six to three. Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin 
America, xvi.  
President Woodrow Wilson arguably brought the United States out of its isolationist policies, but 
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In 2006, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva took action and directed the civilian-
led MOD to draft the first Brazilian NDS. Nelson Jobim (Minister of Defense) and 
Roberto Unger (Minister Head of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs of the Presidency) 
drafted an overarching defense strategy that would become the third official iteration of 
any codified defense policy in Brazil. The two ministers submitted the first National 
Defense Strategy to President da Silva in 2008—to commemorate the upcoming tenth 
anniversary of the MOD.85 
The Brazilian NDS is limited on details, but expansive in vision. One of the goals 
of this document was to brand national defense as a “theme of interest of all sectors of the 
Brazilian society” by “inserting defense issues into the national agenda.”86 Were defense 
issues not a part of the national discussion prior to the 2008 NDS? Security issues were 
likely discussed frequently in political and military circles, but the intent of the NDS was 
to make national defense a bigger portion of the social dialogue while avoiding the taboo 
mention of “national security,” a term harboring the residual fear stemming from the 
military dictatorship era.  
For Brazil and Latin America in general, history is not just something that 
happened long ago, but includes those experiences that actually shape policy in the 
present.87 Something as simple as how a policy would be named had to be acknowledged 
in order to avoid the appearance of following an unintended path toward the 1970s 
National Security Law, still fresh in the minds of the people (even though the NDS is a 
national security strategy by another name).88 The term “national security” does appear 
one time on the penultimate page of the 2008 NDS; however, the term is essentially 
buried in the document as an appendix.89 Changing policy takes time and the more time 
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goes by, the easier it becomes to move forward from a troubled past. The problem here is 
that allowing time to pass further delayed the drafting of the NDS.90 
Brazil’s “no enemies” theory within the NDS understates many facets of Brazilian 
international strategy and is a domestic issue that plays a part in its national defense 
strategy.91 There is some truth to this doctrine in that as countries integrate economically, 
external conflict becomes much more complicated.92 Still, if “the more challenging 
international security environment … is likely to have [a] paradoxical effect of making 
civil-military relations better” in Brazil, what does this perception in the lack of perceived 
security threats say about the current state of civil-military relations in Brazil?93 An 
increase in internal versus external threats fosters the need for a more centralized security 
apparatus, which led to the 1964 military regime in the first place.94 Fundamentally, 
Brazil argues against having strong civil-military relations when it says it has no enemies 
and, perhaps unknowingly, rationalizes the feasibility of military rule. 
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Not having any enemies does not mean that Brazil does not have any threats. One 
report shows that Brazil’s threats come from Colombia and other neighbors as they 
become further involved in the drug trade,95 yet, in actuality, the “locus of conflict has 
shifted from between to within states.”96  
Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson further explained the ramifications of 
Brazil’s “no enemies” policy. They stated that Brazil has no perceived threats that require 
military capabilities and that Brazil is also geopolitically satisfied and has no major 
boundary disputes, which is impressive since they have 10 neighboring countries to deal 
with. Argentina is no longer an issue after a decades-long rivalry and this relative peace 
places Brazil in a unique position within international affairs. Bruneau and Tollefson also 
mention that Brazilians believe they are immune to terrorism and believe they would be 
at the bottom of any list of potential targets. Declaring itself enemy-free, however, creates 
some challenges for Brazil. Defense issues receive a lack of political attention as they are 
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funding and Brazil will not have the resources it needs to take care of internal security, 
which is a major domestic issue and hinders itself from achieving its international 
aspirations.97 
A lack of civilian knowledge and motivation in the defense sector of government, 
coupled with the fear of emulating the military dictatorship’s national security law, 
prolonged the period in which Brazil’s Ministry of Defense took to write its first national 
defense strategy. Between 1999 and 2008, civilian defense knowledge could not 
contribute to publishing effective strategy even though defense knowledge was increasing 
due to civilians attending Brazil’s Escola Superior da Guerra (Higher War College) “in 
which senior military officers mix with civilians.”98 Nevertheless, the first NDS was 
written sooner than anticipated in order to prepare Brazil to compete in hosting the World 
Cup, the Summer Olympic Games, and to show the international community that it was 
serious about security abroad as well as within its own borders—which would also justify 
a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.  
Lastly, it appears the 2008 National Defense Strategy is primarily a political 
document—a mission statement for the nation’s future. Brazil is demonstrating to the 
world that it can craft a national security strategy that deals with its external threats while 
simultaneously addressing its internal security issues so it can negotiate more legitimately 
with other established democracies in matters of international affairs and foreign policy. 
A formulized national defense strategy is important for Brazil since its constitution still 
allows the military to step in when law enforcement cannot provide effective internal 
security.99 As long as Brazil can effectively diversify security responsibilities among its 
law enforcement agencies and help them be effective through implementing this national 
defense strategy, funding their respective missions, and making needed adjustments along 
the way, Brazil can avoid future coup attempts and further consolidate and strengthen its 
democracy. Whether or not the next iteration of the NDS will take another decade for the 
MOD to produce remains to be seen. 
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Five years have passed since the creation of Brazil’s NDS and a more in-depth 
analysis might yield insights as to the overall effectiveness of this delayed defense 
document. Essentially, the NDS is a top-down document, with limited funding attached 
to accomplish many of its stated objectives. The NDS focuses resources on handling all 
national security threats, both internal and external ones, using Brazil’s diversified law 
enforcement agencies and military. Brazil is further strengthening its democratic 
institutions by avoiding situations that could result in similar conditions seen in 1964 
when the military regime began—stemming from an ideological disconnect between 
civilian leaders and the military as to the best way to handle a given national security 
crisis. While a national defense strategy is a start, actually implementing the overall 
vision of the NDS and measuring the results will determine Brazilian national security 
policy success.  
3. White Book on National Defense: 2012 
In 2012, Brazil’s Ministry of Defense published a White Book on National 
Defense at the direction of President Dilma Rousseff. Again, a major defense initiative 
instigated by a powerful civilian catalyst, just as the Ministry of Defense and the National 
Defense Strategy came into existence.  
Brazil’s White Book essentially contains the same topics that the 2008 NDS 
addressed, but presented in an expanded form and explaining how the defense side of 
Brazil’s government will fulfill the strategy contained in the 2008 NDS. Still, unlike the 
NDS, which was a product of a decree (without legislative backing) until 2013, the Livro 
Branco (White Book) is based on complementary law, with legislative clout, and must be 
written every four years.100 The White Book is also four times as long as the NDS and yet 
states the same principles.  
So why did Brazil release White Book in the first place? Some “observers say the 
White [Book] initiative, together with the 2008 National Defense Strategy, has improved 
civilian-military relations within the country and inspired Brazil’s neighbors to consider 
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the strategic ramifications of a militarily powerful Brazil.”101 President Rousseff’s goal is 
to take the dialogue of defense policy and make it a matter of domestic policy since “civil 
society should understand that defense issues are not exclusive to the military.”102 Time 
will tell if the White Book will be an effective guide for future defense strategy and 
attainment, or just another para mundo ver (for the world to see) propaganda document 
without the resources and incentives behind it to actually implement. In other words, the 
2012 White Book’s main purpose is to “make defense objectives, capabilities, and 
strategies … visible to others in the region and beyond.”103 
B. EXPLAINING THE TIMING OF DEFENSE POLICY IN BRAZIL 
Many possible factors contributed to Brazil formulating its defense policy though 
some factors more than others help explain the actual timing of the different policy 
documents. Before continuing with the original four research dimensions or hypotheses 
as applied to defense policy, it is of note that the overarching driver in Brazil, and 
elsewhere in Latin America, is that “no policy realm is more tied to state sovereignty than 
defense [since] a nation cannot claim to be sovereign if it loses control of its territory; 
fails to safeguard its borders, or deter foreign aggressors—all central elements of defense 
preparedness.”104 Brazilian leadership realized that defense strategy was important and a 
wave of defense policy followed, but what were the actual drivers of that realization? 
1. Civilian Defense Knowledge 
As David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas declared, “Politician’s emphasis on 
civil-military power relations and coup prevention has masked the stark deficiencies in 
civilian attention to defense policy across the region.”105 Since the Ministry of Defense is 
an institution run by civilians, defense strategy and policy needed attention from 
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competent civilian leadership in order to be published without relying solely on military 
input. The problem in Brazil and other Latin American countries is that it is common to 
not have career tracks in which a civilian can remain in one organization long enough to 
develop a knowledge base that will allow the organization to be effective.  
Brazilian national leadership knew that real change needed to occur outside of the 
established defense institutions in the absence of any real advance in policy. Dr. Thomas 
Bruneau mentions that early on in its existence the “MOD was under weak and erratic 
leadership, and did not develop as an institution.”106 An institution such as the MOD will 
flounder in the absence of leadership, especially without engaged and knowledgeable 
personnel to carry out the mission. This lack of incentive for civilians to learn enough 
about their mission to be effective in making lasting change is what David Pion-Berlin 
and Harold Trinkunas observed as “attention deficits.” These scholars stated that 
although “national defense policy has not been a high priority … a well thought-out 
defense policy could certainly contribute to national security.”107 Brazilian politicians 
took more than two decades to draft the NDS because they could “ignore defense without 
incurring great risks to national security” to some extent.108 
The lack of effective civilian oversight and fleeting defense knowledge not only 
delayed the drafting cogent defense strategy, but also impaired Brazil’s struggle to 
control one of Brazil’s most insecure regions: the Tri-border Area. The national, state, 
and local governments in Brazil remained ineffective in their handling of the TBA. The 
politicians insisted that the level of terrorist activity was minimal and did not deserve as 
much attention and resources as other security concerns wanted or needed. Despite a 
handful of successful operations to identify illegal operations, routes, and vehicles, the 
few confiscations made were a small portion of the overall problem and still require 
resolution. The government has generally shown apathy toward the TBA as shown in the 
government’s lack of effective debate, legislation, and inclusion in a national security 
policy up until the NDS of 2008. Grappling with complex security issues, such as the 
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TBA, can delay effective policy like the NDS due to paralysis by analysis. Shuffling 
civilian leaders around different organizations or spending too much time drafting policy 
and not spending enough time implementing some sort of ad-hoc solution and reassessing 
if it is effective, is not the way to handle national security.109 
Maria Celina D’Araujo, a proponent of more involved civilian leadership in 
defense matters, strengthens Stepan’s argument that democratic civilian leadership could 
not achieve full civilian control of the armed forces during Brazil’s democratization. She 
argued that the situation in Brazil would remain stagnant unless change happened within 
the armed forces themselves and civilian attitudes changed toward an increased role in 
controlling the military, which is another form of the knowledge needed to manage 
defense issues.110 In addition, as some experienced military personnel retire and 
transition to civilian roles their expertise and knowledge will add to the building cadre of 
effective civilian leaders in the CMR construct.111 Conversely, the incentive for retired 
officers to pass on their knowledge and serve as government civilians will not happen if 
the prevailing pension system continues giving retired military too generous of a pension, 
which contributes to Brazil spending 73.6 percent of its total defense budget on 
personnel.112 
This hypothesis of a civilian knowledge deficiency is convincing because it not 
only contributed to the delay in the establishment of the MOD, but further compounded 
Brazil’s national security issues by not producing the knowledge and motivation 
necessary to draft the National Defense Strategy, which is arguably the crux of many 
defense and political policies that followed. The lack of civilian knowledge underfunds 
critical military missions as well since “civilian disinterest in defense policy has also 
contributed to the lack of basic operating resources.”113  
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2. Political Incentives 
J. Samuel Fitch stated, “The Brazilian experience vividly demonstrates the 
importance of the political context—particularly the political strength or weakness of the 
president—as a force shaping military policy.”114 Political incentives drive the need for 
civilian control of the military and “is a low-cost means of achieving a relative calm in 
civil-military affairs without investing in extensive institution building, expertise, 
legislative oversight, and large budgets.”115 The problem with this type of arrangement is 
the lack of synergy between politicians and military leaders in creating effective lasting 
institutions because “civilian leaders do not meddle in core military interests if the 
military observes similar rules about the government’s core interests.”116 That very few 
nations outside of the United States had politicians with incentives to reform the defense 
establishment was another issue that Brazil needed to deal with.117 Additionally, “most 
countries do not develop public national security strategies because they would rather not 
call attention to the issue, for fear that they would have to make good on their declared 
goals.”118 
Again, Brazil eventually became serious about national defense as it sought to 
obtain a permanent seat in the United Nations (UN) Security Council and wanted to 
assimilate policies implemented by established UN members.119 Brazilian politicians 
eventually realized that it could not delay the national security/defense process any 
longer. Civilian leadership also realized that although national defense may not have been 
a sociopolitical priority in the early stages of its democratic transition, a national defense 
strategy was essential in developing foreign and domestic policy. By demonstrating its 
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credibility (internationally and regionally) as a developed nation, Brazil could become a 
peer with established nations in the realm of international affairs.  
A counterargument to this need to be defense-minded is the perception that the 
United States’ role in military affairs increased during the Cardoso administration and 
Brazil sought to counter that perception by seeking a seat on the UN Security Council to 
balance the perceived (or real) influence that the U.S. had on Brazilian defense policy.120 
In the absence of primary sources explaining the motivations of Brazil’s civilian and 
military leaders, at least on the surface, more forces appear to be at work. 
If Brazil wanted to compete for UN Security Council permanent membership, it 
needed to look and act like the other permanent-member countries on the council in terms 
of economic, military, social, and nuclear prowess. The 2008 Brazilian NDS addressed 
all four of these areas. The NDS tackles economic issues with a desire to invest in its 
defense industry and have indigenous defense capabilities that will compete effectively in 
the world market. The strategy organizes the military in such a way as to capitalize on a 
robust defense industry and have the most state-of-the-art equipment. Brazil integrates 
the NDS socially as a major part of the national agenda and develops its nuclear prowess 
beyond electricity production by proposing the militarization of nuclear technology 
through its nuclear-powered submarine program.121  
In addition to assimilating to other UN Security Council members on paper, 
Brazil has engaged in peacekeeping and other “international security endeavors [to 
justify] … a permanent UN Security Council seat.”122 Brazil is not the only country 
vying for a permanent UN Security Council seat, however. Brazil’s biggest competition 
in gaining a permanent seat in the Security Council is arguably India, which is further 
ahead than Brazil in some of these research dimensions, especially in the nuclear arena. 
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Gaining a UN Security Council seat is a major priority for Brazil and created the impetus 
for the MOD to draft a NDS sooner rather than later. 
Brazilian politicians also needed time to formulate policy that distanced itself 
from its military dictatorship history and avoided using the term ‘national security’ while 
at the same time addressing security issues. National security had a negative connotation 
and reminded citizens of the bygone military regime’s repressive policies.123 In 
contemporary language, national security strategy goes beyond just defense and military 
organizations and includes internal and external threats, but Brazil could not name its 
national policy accurately because of the “national security program” references used 
during the decades-long authoritarian regime.124 In addition, Brazil started to implement 
what I call ‘security force diversification’ and created multiple law enforcement agencies 
to balance against the military in order to have additional forces to call upon in times of 
crisis instead of only having the option to use military forces. Brazil was consolidating its 
democracy by making it more difficult for a coup to occur in the future by establishing a 
civilian-led Ministry of Defense, diversifying the law enforcement capacity of the 
country, and removing or changing references in the national defense doctrine that were 
associated with the former military dictatorship. 
Additionally, Brazil’s civilian leadership developed a defense strategy as it 
desired to compete for high-visibility events such as the Olympic Games and the Soccer 
World Cup. The Brazilians saw these sporting events as not only an opportunity to 
compete athletically, but also as an “instrument for promoting national integration … 
[and] even became a matter of national security.”125 Essentially, if the nation came 
together around a common purpose, then internal stability increases and Brazil gains 
more legitimacy on international issues.  
Brazil had participated in the Olympic Games since 1920, but had never hosted 
them before. The Brazilian government tried to host the 2004 Olympic Games but lost 
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and decided to forgo bidding for the 2008 games so it could host the 2007 Pan American 
Games, the largest sporting event in America and the second largest in the world.126 
According to the Comitê Olímpico Brasileiro (Brazilian Olympic Committee), the goal of 
having the Olympic and Paralympic games in Rio de Janeiro was to “[bring] sustainable 
development [to] Brazil … [which] development would be associated with the 
transformation of the city, with the emergence of a new urban infrastructure, new 
environmental initiatives, … continued growth of the economy and tourism in the 
country, bringing to Brazil a new level of international recognition and reinforcing the 
country’s reputation of being an exciting place where it is good to live, do business and 
[visit].”127  
In addition to the Olympic Games, Brazil had not hosted the World Cup since 
1950 and won the bid in late October 2007 to host the prestigious 2014 soccer 
tournament.128 Hosting these two events created an opportunity, and when “opportunities 
arise … it depends on leaders to seize them.”129 Coincidentally, on September 6, 2007 
(one month before the World Cup bid announcement), Brazilian President da Silva called 
for a “Ministerial Committee” to “design” the NDS.130 Even though da Silva called for 
the drafting of a NDS in 2006, the announcement for a new NDS committee showed that 
little progress was being made and that the NDS was an important political document for 
Brazil in more ways than one: the NDS would focus the government’s attention on 
national security issues and act as a public service announcement to the world that Brazil 
was a safe place to invest and play. Hosting the Pan American Games in 2007 might have 
brought more credibility to Brazil than crafting a security document, but this thesis 
contends that these setbacks of not winning high-visibility events earlier motivated the 
government to examine what was lacking and asked the Ministry of Defense to draft the 
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NDS toward securing the country for the people and for events such as these. In other 
words, the MOD and national leadership would have taken longer to craft an NDS had it 
not had high-visibility events to compete for.  
3. Prerogatives 
The military prerogatives that once existed and prevented change in the civil-
military relationship construct in Brazil do not appear to be an obvious issue today. As 
applied contemporarily, Dr. Stepan’s foresight explains the current condition of CMR in 
Brazil such that “in an uncontested model of civilian control of the military, both military 
prerogatives and articulated conflict are low.”131 Brazilian executive leadership claims 
not to have any enemies (military included) and the military is freely able to counter any 
internal security threats as they arise—through a few different programs. Also, as Brazil’s 
military priorities become more grandiose, its neighbors may see that as a security 
dilemma as discussed earlier concerning Brazil’s views of Venezuela increasing its 
defense capacity during the Chavez administration. However, even though “Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile well exemplify dimensions of the classic security dilemma … their 
interstate relations perhaps have never been better.”132 The cooperation among these 
countries is better than ever and deploying armed forces along the borders as a show of 
force is no longer an issue.133 
Security issues are still at the forefront of Brazilian grand strategy and create a 
great internal dilemma for Brazil so the new military prerogative is not to appear weak on 
defense. Brazil also wants to demonstrate to the international community that it has plans 
to confront existing security and defense issues. Well-armed gangs and illicit economic 
growth are fueling crime. Crime has the dual effect of hindering economic performance 
and prestige abroad. By effectively handling security issues, especially in proximity to  
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major population centers, Brazil is able to compete as a safe place to host the world’s 
premier events, bring more business to the country, and handle a mix of exogenous and 
endogenous security threats.  
Jorge Zaverucha argued that “with the end of the Cold War and in the absence of 
any border conflict, the Brazilian government turned even more to their domestic affairs,” 
which delayed defense strategy, but also ignored important internal security issues that 
will be discussed in this section.134 Additionally, Brazil needed to form institutions and 
policy to counter historical experience that in times of internal crisis, the military could 
have carte blanche to restore order.135 Defense strategy, along with constitutional 
amendments, guarantees the appropriate amount of civil-military oversight for any given 
security concern.  
It has been said that “civilian control … is irrelevant unless the armed forces can 
effectively fulfill their roles and missions.”136 One way for civilian leaders to weaken 
military prerogatives, while at the same time providing salient roles and missions to the 
military, is to separate the armed forces from domestic issues and focus them on external 
issues. In the late 1990s, this idea seemed difficult since the majority of the armed forces 
concentrated around urban centers of the country. By finding external missions, civilian 
control of the military would allow the military to handle security and the civilians to 
handle the politics.137 Moreover, civilian leaders over time learned how far they could 
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“established precedents and expectations.”138 In summary, military prerogatives eroded 
as civilian leadership learned how to lead and the military consented to civilian 
leadership with fewer caveats.139 
 In the absence of concrete external threats, Brazil is currently implementing 
several projects to address perceived external security challenges, of which the fronteras 
vivas (living borders) initiative is one of the most prominent (see Figure 1). For Brazil, 
“drug trafficking, immigration, ethnic (indigenous) conflicts, and environmental 
protection are becoming more significant nationals security issues in a region where 
traditional border conflicts have either been resolved or have diminished in 
importance.”140  
By appropriating military resources, Brazil desires to address some of these 
contemporary security issues and modernize its interior region along the expansive 
Brazilian border. These projects serve two important purposes: first, a large country can 
only maintain its national security through reinforcing the outermost parts of its landmass 
to discourage illegal immigration, boundary extension by its neighbors, or illicit activity 
in the periphery; second, these projects create institutional infrastructure to combat 
security issues at the fringes before they come into the population centers of the country 
while at the same time sustaining the new local communities. Without these 
infrastructure projects, there would be no incentive for people to live in such remote areas 
and more difficult for law enforcement to secure the border against perceived and very 
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139 These military prerogatives posed a threat to Brazil if it did not learn from its militaristic past 
during this tenuous period of democratic transition. Wendy Hunter stated that “while not posing an 
immediate threat to the stability of democracy, remaining pockets of military autonomy, specific missions 
that the armed forces persist in advocating or adopting, and attitudes that officers continue to harbor inhibit 
civilian supremacy and impair the quality of democracy.” Hunter, “Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile,” 300. 
Although characterizing the Southern Cone of South America in one broad academic brushstroke, 
Hunter’s points apply to Brazil quite well. One mission in particular, the nuclear submarine program, is 
such an example of a specific program or mission that the military used to preserve its autonomy, albeit in a 
difficult fiscal environment. 
140 Ibid., 309. 
 41 
real national security threats.141 Unfortunately, Brazil is addressing the boundary issues 
in the Amazon region, but neglecting the security relations with Argentina that are not 
handled with the attention those economic issues in the region receive.142 
 
Figure 1.  Brazil’s fronteras vivas projects143 
Another challenging national defense issue for Brazil is the tri-border area (TBA) 
formed with Argentina and Paraguay in the Foz do Iguaçu area (see Figure 2). The 
security challenge in this region is a byproduct of geography. The TBA encompasses 
interior spaces within Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, further complicating the issue of 
cooperative security. Because of the TBA’s distance from urbanized areas among the 
three nations, a lawless culture has developed in the area. This region is characterized as 
a hub for organized crime and alleged terrorist activity for many infamous terrorist 
                                                 
141 David S. Salisbury et al., “Fronteras Vivas or Dead Ends? The Impact of Military Settlement 
Projects in the Amazon Borderlands,” Journal of Latin American Geography 9, no. 2 (2010): 51–52. 
142 David R. Mares, “Conclusion: Civil-Military Relations, Democracy, and Regional Security in 
Comparative Perspective,” in Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin 
America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe, ed. David R. Mares (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 
251. 
143 Salisbury et al., “Fronteras Vivas or Dead Ends? The Impact of Military Settlement Projects in the 
Amazon Borderlands,” 52.  
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groups such as “Egypt’s Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and Al-Jihad, al Qaeda, Hamas, 
Hizballah, and al-Muqawamah.”144 The challenge for Brazil is how to deal with the 
TBA, whether or not the United States should be involved, and whether to address the 
security issues in the region through diplomatic, economic, or military means.145 
 
Figure 2.  The South American Tri-border Region146  
Brazilian civilians and military leaders have focused on a few portions of the 
problem in the triple frontier: “drug trafficking, money laundering, arms dealing, 
automobile smuggling, illegal immigration, counterfeiting, piracy, fundraising, recruiting, 
                                                 
144 Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South 
America,” 1. 
145 Patricia Taft, David A. Poplack, and Rita Grossman-Vermaas, The Crime-Terrorism Nexus: Risks 
in the Tri-Border Area (Washington DC: Fund for Peace, 2009), 4, 
http://fundforpeace.org/global/library/ttcvr1208-threatconvergence-triborder-04e.pdf. 
146 Pablo Gato, “Hezbollah Builds a Western Base,” NBC News, accessed January 28, 2014, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/17874369/ns/world_news-americas/t/hezbollah-builds-western-base/. 
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and alleged nuclear material smuggling.”147 Since the range of issues is so vast, no single 
government entity can effectively counter the local strongmen in the region. Brazil, 
Argentina, and to a lesser extent Paraguay, attempt military and police actions but lack 
the prosecutory power that should come from the Brazilian capitol, which would make 
catching criminals more incentivized for law enforcement agencies.148 
Brazilian criminal policy legislation and implementation are largely left in the 
hands of individual states. As a result, the local forces are often small and only perform 
investigative services. Law enforcement credibility is damaged because of the many 
reports of corruption and human rights violations among its police forces as well. In spite 
of these issues, the amount of attention in the region has grown since 2001, but has 
shown very little progress thus far. As Brazil continued its emphasis on stabilizing the 
TBA, it delayed creating effective institutions and policy that had a lasting effect. Once a 
MOD and a NDS were in place, Brazil could appear to be more like its developed peers 
and appear safer for international involvement.149 
What started as a foreign policy issue, the geographic frontier in Brazil plays a 
role in the prerogatives and motivations of the armed forces in Brazil as well. Similar to 
the fronteiras vivas project, Calha Norte tried unsuccessfully to move the preponderance 
of the armed forces from the southern portion on the country to the north. Additionally, 
Brazil started a $1.2 billion Amazonian watch system (SIVAM) to prevent the 
“internationalization” of the Amazon region as well as combat similar types of issues 
discussed with the TBA and fonteiras vivas including: countering drug trafficking, 
preventing border smuggling, protecting indigenous people, preserving environmental 
resources, and establishing a presence in the region.150 Essentially, Brazil confronts many 
                                                 
147 Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South 
America,” 1, 50–59. 
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issues due to its “geographic proximity” to many countries and requires the strategy and 
resources to successfully complete these missions.151 
4. Institutional Development 
According to Thomas Bruneau et al., effective civil-military relations “[are] 
grounded in and exercised through institutions ranging from organic laws that empower 
the Ministry of Defense, oversight committees and executive bodies that direct police, to 
budget processes and civilian control of promotions within intelligence agencies.”152 The 
institutions are finally in place and the issue now becomes a matter of what the MOD will 
continue to do to further consolidate the role of civil-military relations into its 
organization and not share responsibilities with the Public Ministry or any other 
institution. However, as repeated many times in this thesis, institutions are useless if 
civilians do not know what they should accomplish, especially when the MOD has 
“institutional interests of its own and prerogatives its members seek to advance.”153 
Civilians must know something about defense and they must be “aware of what 
they do not know if they are to be successful in utilizing the armed forces and the more 
widely construed ‘security forces’ to the best advantage of their government and 
nation.”154 The military has long been called “remarkably open and transparent about 
defense issues” and the MOD should bring that transparency and expertise to anything 
defense related.155 Consolidation and centralization of defense knowledge and direction 
is the next step and could only come after clear defense policy established an end-state to 
work towards. This end-state often appears as strengthened legitimacy, efficacy, and 
capacity in further developing the Ministry of Defense as an institution of effective 
CMR.156 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Effective CMR is both a byproduct and a function of a strong democracy—as 
democracy consolidates and deepens so will civil-military relations.157 Once democracy 
consolidates, other aspects of government will fall into place including CMR. Synergy is 
possible within CMR as 1) civilians and military give and take knowledge from each 
other, 2) policy is developed by both parties, and 3) civilians expect compliance and the 
military expects resources to carry it out. However, I agree with David Mares in that 
“civil-military relationships are fluid” and require time to achieve the type of relations the 
political environment supports, which appears to lean toward civilian-dominant CMR.158 
As Bruneau and Matei observed, most civil-military relations research focuses on 
civilian control of the military (or lack thereof during military regimes), but ignores the 
efforts of the military in attempting to create a CMR symbiosis between civilians and 
their military counterparts. These two authors discuss the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the military component, but more research need to happen concerning the synergy that 
materializes when the national defense properly includes the roles and mission of the 
military as demonstrated in well-written defense strategy.159 However, CMR often is 
tainted by politics and as applied to the MOD or national defense strategy, synergy may 
be more difficult to attain as civilians and military have different political angles to 
pursue. 
                                                 
157 Although this analysis started out as a thesis about democratization and consolidating civil-military 
relations, it quickly transitioned into questions of defense reform and the effects on CMR as well. This 
paper also analyzed the rational, structural, and cultural reasons for the delay in publishing Brazilian 
defense policy. Pion-Berlin, “Introduction,” 17. 
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structuralist point of view, Brazil changed the institutional make-up of civil-military relations by 
establishing a Ministry of Defense and continues to use that institution as the focal point of civil-military 
relations consolidation. From a cultural standpoint, the deixa para manha and para ingles ver doctrine 
continues to permeate Brazilian society and does not reflect laziness or apathy, but a cultural legacy that 
will either continue or change throughout the genesis of CMR in Brazil 
158 Ibid. 
159 Bruneau and Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military 
Relations,” 923. 
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A further argument of this thesis is that outside of the reasons for the delay in 
defense policy, cogent defense policy will ensure that the right missions get codified and 
funded. Politicians will see that the military is focusing on only the right type and amount 
of missions based on the defense strategy and limited resources are neither squandered by 
the politicians apportioning them nor by the military utilizing them.160 
Brazil’s democracy is consolidating, which requires additional time to establish 
itself internationally. It needs to integrate and strengthen the necessary institutions that 
will allow it to become an established democracy among the developed nations of the 
world. If countries such as Brazil want to hasten the process, they must turn knowledge 
into wisdom by putting knowledge into action, creating the institutions, mechanisms, and 
incentives necessary to become an established democracy. Finally, Brazil has not had the 
tumultuous past of most countries, which may explain the lack of development in Brazil 
that the U.S. had after fighting in the world wars since it was James Tilly’s notion that the 
“war made the state and the state made war.”161 Maybe Brazil’s “no enemies” doctrine is 
preventing what it needs to ‘arrive’ on the international scene? 
Now that Brazil has the institutions to further develop civil-military relations 
(namely the MOD) and publish defense strategy, the next step is to formulate what 
exactly Brazil’s national security strategy should contain. For the military regime of 1964 
- 1985, national security doctrine was concrete and was carried out in unison by the 
military regime. In contemporary Brazil, threats can come from anywhere: the economy, 
the citizenry, the military, etc. and must be addressed.  
This thesis also discussed the role that civilian knowledge, military prerogatives, 
incentives, political objectives, and institutions have on the development of civil-military 
relations in Brazil, but is there a correct order to accomplish these items in? Ideally, 
incentives and prerogatives drive synergistic defense knowledge between civilians and 
the military and then policy gets created before institutions grow to fulfill the roles and 
missions outlined in the national defense strategy. In Brazil, it appears that political 
                                                 
160 Pion-Berlin, “The Challenge to Reform Defense,” 276. 
161 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992 (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 
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incentives drove the creation of the MOD by President Cardoso with the civilian and 
military leadership backfilling their stated mission with policy and potentially some 
future execution of the policy.  
Additionally, it appears that democracy follows a series of natural laws in its path 
to consolidation and strength. There are also certain milestones that appear to be required 
to strengthen CMR and Brazil is passing through those much faster than established 
democracies did. Moreover, it appears that civil-military relations are extremely 
important to a nation as it aspires to sovereignty and prosperity; diplomacy and national 
defense are arguably two of the few things the government is able to handle efficiently 
and CMR play a crucial role in both, which Brazil is finally internalizing. Since “civil-
military conflicts … have often constrained sovereignty and weakened legitimacy” of the 
government, it is important that governments support the CMR apparatuses to ensure 
democratic consolidation and national security.162  
One final counterargument to this whole analysis of defense strategy evolution is 
Brazil always had a defense strategy because the military probably had one. While this is 
potentially true, this thesis identifies policy as an indicator of effective civil-military 
relations theory and once the transition to democracy started, institutions and policy came 
slowly, therefore a published strategy was lacking. In essence, national security strategy 
has to originate in the executive branch of the government since they represent the people 
in a democratic society. In a constitutional democracy, the president decides on the 
direction that policy should go as seen with Presidents Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff. 
Coincidentally, the national defense organizational changes discussed in this thesis 
occurred following periods of national economic growth.163  
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163 “The economy, having [stabilized] under Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the mid-1990s, 
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persuaded voters in the same year to choose as president his technocratic protégée, Dilma Rousseff.” “Has 




Finally, each one of the research dimensions analyzed here appears to be valid; 
however, some are more valid than others in explaining the evolution of defense policy in 
Brazil. Essentially, since civil-military relations involve people, people are the most 
important variable in the strengthening and consolidation of CMR in any given country. 
In Brazil, it was the leadership of President Cardoso in establishing the MOD and 
President Lula da Silva directing the new era of published defense policy that showcased 
how not only is democracy consolidating in Brazil, but so are civil-military relations. It is 
not a question of what will be the next defense milestone in Brazil’s CMR evolution, but 
who will be the catalyst of it? 
David Pion-Berlin offers one perspective on the impact of this research in the 
field of Brazilian civil-military relations when he said: 
None of us has the last word on the study of civil-military relations. 
Undoubtedly, [this thesis] will raise as many questions as they answer, 
given the fast-paced changes in and around the civil-military world, the 
complexities of the subject, and the limitations of [my] approaches. That is 
all good, since it is those questions that will inevitably lead to new 
research.164 
Additionally, David Mares offers me additional consolation in that this thesis “provides a 
speculative answer in the hopes of encouraging more research” in the realm of Brazilian 
civil-military relations.165  
 
                                                 
164 Pion-Berlin, “Introduction,” 29. 
165 Mares, “Conclusion: Civil-Military Relations, Democracy, and Regional Security in Comparative 
Perspective,” 247. 
 49 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Agüero, Felipe. “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining: Civilians and the Military in 
Shaping Postauthoritarian Regimes.” In Civil-Military Relations in Latin 
America: New Analytical Perspectives, edited by David Pion-Berlin. Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 
Arceneaux, Craig L., and David Pion-Berlin. Transforming Latin America: The 
International and Domestic Origins of Change. Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2005. 
Bacevich, Andrew J. “Whose Army?” In The Modern American Military, edited by 
David M. Kennedy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Bennett, David J. “The Trinity: A New Approach to Civil-Military Relations?” Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. 
Bland, Douglas L. “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations.” Armed Forces & 
Society 26, no. 1 (1999): 7–25. 
Brazil Defence & Security Report: Q2 2013. London, UK: Business Monitor 
International, 2013. 
Bruneau, Thomas C. “Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the 
Fox Revisited.” Revista Fuerzas Armadas Y Sociedad 19, no. 1 (2005): 111–131. 
Bruneau, Thomas C.  and Richard B. Goetze Jr. “Civilian-Military Relations in Latin 
America.” Military Review 86, no. 5 (2006): 67–74. 
Bruneau, Thomas C. and Florina Cristiana Matei. “Towards a New Conceptualization of 
Democratization and Civil-Military Relations.” Democratization 15, no. 5 (2008): 
909–929. 
Bruneau, Thomas C. and Scott D. Tollefson. “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric 
and Reality.” Unpublished, 2013. 
Bruneau, Thomas C.  and Harold A. Trinkunas. “Global Trends and Their Impact on 
Civil-Military Relations” Unpublished, 2007. 
———. “International Democracy Promotion and Its Impacts on Civil-Military 
Relations.” In Global Politics of Defense Reform, edited by Thomas Bruneau and 
Harold Trinkunas. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
 
 50 
Buchanan, Paul G. “Chameleon, Tortoise, or Toad: The Changing US Security Role in 
Contemporary Latin America.” In International Security & Democracy: Latin 
America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era, edited by Jorge I. 
Domínguez. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998. 
“Câmara Aprova Política Nacional de Defesa, Estratégia Nacional de Defesa E Livro 
Branco.” DefesaNet, September 12, 2013. 
http://www.defesanet.com.br/defesa/noticia/12227/DEFESA---Camara-aprova-
Politica-Nacional-de-Defesa--Estrategia-Nacional-de-Defesa-e-Livro-Branco/. 
Clunan, Anne. “Globalization and the Impact of Norms on Defense Restructuring.” In 
Global Politics of Defense Reform, edited by Thomas Bruneau and Harold 
Trinkunas, 35–45. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
D’Araujo, Maria Celina. “Perspectiva Brasileira Para Os Novos Aspectos Da Segurança 
Regional.” Cadernos Adenauer XI, no. 4. O Brasil No Context Político Regional 
(2010): 34–42. 
Desch, Michael C. Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 
———. “The Changing International Environment and Civil-Military Relations in Post-
Cold War Southern Latin America.” In Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-
Transition Latin America, edited by Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark. Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 
———. “Why Latin America May Miss the Cold War–The United States and the Future 
of Inter-American Security Relations.” In International Security & Democracy: 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era, edited by Jorge I. 
Domínguez, 245–265. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998. 
Domínguez, Jorge I. “Security, Peace, and Democracy in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.” In International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era, edited by Jorge I. Domínguez. Pittsburgh, 
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998. 
Domínguez, Jorge I., and Michael Shifter. Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin 
America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. 
Escudé, Carlos, and Andrés Fontana. “Argentina’s Security Policies: Their Rationale and 
Regional Context.” In International Security and Democracy Latin America and 
the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era, edited by Jorge I. Domínguez, 51–80. 
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998. 
Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1999. 
 51 
Fitch, J Samuel. “Military Attitudes toward Democracy in Latin America.” In Civil-
Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, edited by 
David Pion-Berlin, 59–87. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
2001. 
———. The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998. 
Fujita, Edmundo Sussumo. “O Brasil E O Conselho de Segurança: Notas Sobre Uma 
Década de Transição (1985-1995).” Parcerias Estratégicas 1, no. 2 (2009): 67–
78. 
Garretón, Manuel Antonio. Fear in Military Regimes: An Overview. Los Angeles, CA: 
University of California Press, 1992. 
Gato, Pablo. “Hezbollah Builds a Western Base.” Msnbc.com. Accessed January 28, 
2014. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/17874369/ns/world_news-
americas/t/hezbollah-builds-western-base/. 
Ham Jr., Linwood. Brazil’s National Defense Strategy--A Deepening of Civilian Control. 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009. 
“Has Brazil Blown It?” The Economist, September 28, 2013. 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21586833-stagnant-economy-bloated-
state-and-mass-protests-mean-dilma-rousseff-must-change-course-has. 
Hirst, Monica. “Security Policies, Democratization, and Regional Integration in the 
Southern Cone.” In International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era, edited by Jorge I. Domínguez. Pittsburgh, 
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998. 
Hodges, Vicki. “Brazil to Stage 2014 World Cup.” Telegraph, October 30, 2007. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/2324530/Brazil-to-stage-2014-World-
Cup.html. 
Hudson, Rex. “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of 
South America.” Washington DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research 
Division, 2003. 
Hulse, Janie. “Brazilian Military’s White Paper to Guide Future Defense Priorities.” 





Hunter, Wendy. “Assessing Civil-Military Relations in Postauthoritarian Brazil.” In 
Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions, and Processes, edited by Peter R. 
Kingstone and Timothy Joseph Power. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2000. 
———. “Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile: Present Trends, Future 
Prospects.” In Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America, edited 
by Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1998. 
———. Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers. Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. 
———. “Reason, Culture, or Structure? Assessing Civil-Military Dynamics in Brazil.” In 
Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, edited by 
David Pion-Berlin, 36–58. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
2001. 
Jobim, Nelson, and Roberto Mangabeira Unger. “National Strategy of Defense: Peace 
and Security for Brazil.” Brazilian Ministry of Defense. 2008. 
http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/estrategia/arquivos/estrategia_defesa_naci
onal_ingles.pdf. 
Kacowicz, Arie M. Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in 
Comparative Perspective. Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1998. 
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011. 
Loveman, Brian. “Historical Foundations of Civil-Military Relations in Spanish 
America.” In Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical 
Perspectives, edited by David Pion-Berlin. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001. 
Mares, David R. “Civil-Military Relations, Democracy, and the Regional 
Neighborhood.” In Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional 
Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe, edited by David R. 
Mares. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. 
———. “Conclusion: Civil-Military Relations, Democracy, and Regional Security in 
Comparative Perspective.” In Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and 
Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe, edited by 
David R. Mares. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. 
 
 53 
———. “Latin American Economic Integration and Democratic Control of the Military: 
Is There a Symbiotic Relationship?” In Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: 
New Analytical Perspectives, edited by David Pion-Berlin. Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 
Meyer, Peter J. Brazil-U.S. Relations. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2010. 
Page, Joseph A. The Brazilians. Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 1995. 
“Perguntas Frequentes.” Rio 2016. Accessed June 2, 2013. 
http://www.rio2016.org/comite-organizador/perguntas-frequentes. 
Pion-Berlin, David. “Civil-Military Circumvention.” In Civil-Military Relations in Latin 
America: New Analytical Perspectives, edited by David Pion-Berlin. Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 
———. “Introduction.” In Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical 
Perspectives, edited by David Pion-Berlin. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001. 
———. “Political Management of the Military in Latin America.” Military Review 85, 
no. 1 (2005): 19–31. 
———. “The Challenge to Reform Defense.” In Global Politics of Defense Reform, 
edited by Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas. New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008. 
———. “The Defense Wisdom Deficit in Latin America: A Reply to Thomas C. 
Bruneau.” Revista Fuerzas Armadas Y Sociedad 20, no. 1 (n.d.): 51–62. 
Pion-Berlin, David and Harold A Trinkunas. “Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore 
Defense Policy in Latin America.” Latin American Research Review 42, no. 3 
(2007): 76–100. 
Prada, Leandro. “Venezuela’s Planned Arms Purchases Leave Neighbors Unsettled. CNS 
News, August 20, 2013. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/venezuelas-planned-
arms-purchases-leave-neighbors-unsettled. 
Prugh, Samuel H. “The Creation of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense.” unpublished, n.d. 
Salisbury, David S., L. Alejandra Antelo Gutiérrez, Carlos L. Pérez Alván, and Jorge W. 
Vela Alvarado. “Fronteras Vivas or Dead Ends? The Impact of Military 
Settlement Projects in the Amazon Borderlands.” Journal of Latin American 
Geography 9, no. 2 (2010): 49–71. 
 
 54 
Skidmore, Thomas E. Brazil: Five Centuries of Change. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2009. 
Stepan, Alfred C. Rethinking Military Political Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
Taft, Patricia, David A. Poplack, and Rita Grossman-Vermaas. The Crime-Terrorism 
Nexus: Risks in the Tri-Border Area. Washington DC: Fund for Peace, 2009. 
http://fundforpeace.org/global/library/ttcvr1208-threatconvergence-triborder-
04e.pdf. 
Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992. Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell, 1992. 
Tollefson, Scott D. “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: The Myth of Tutelary 
Democracy.” Washington DC, 1995. 
Trask, David F. “Presidency, National Security, and Intervention.” In The United States 
Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1989, edited by 
Richard H. Kohn. New York, NY: New York University Press, 1991. 
Trinkunas, Harold. “Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela.” In Civil-
Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, edited by 
David Pion-Berlin, 161–193. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2001. 
Trinkunas, Harold A. Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A 
Comparative Perspective. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
2006. 
Zaverucha, Jorge. “Fragile Democracy and the Militarization of Public Safety in Brazil.” 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
 
 
